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MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES USED BY THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY W >" I *l 

' CONNECTION WITH ACQUISITIONS OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE, „„ .,_ 
INFORMATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 702 OF THE FOREIGN mTELlME^CE—RT 
SURVEILLANCE ACT OF 1978, AS AMENDED : 

Section 1 - Applicability and Scope (U) 

These National Security Agency (NSA) minimization procedures apply to the acquisition, 
retention, use, and dissemination of non-publicly available information concerning 
unconsenting United States persons that is acquired by targeting non-United States persons 
reasonably believed to be located outside the United States in accordance with section 702 of 
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended ("the Act"). (U) 

If NSA determines that it must take action in apparent departure from these minimization 
procedures to protect against an immediate threat to human life (e.g., force protection or 
hostage situations) and that it is not feasible to obtain a timely modification of these 
procedures, NSA may take such action immediately. NSA will report the action taken to the 
Office of the Director of National Intelligence and to the National Security Division of the 
Department of Justice, which will promptly notify the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Court of such activity. (U) 

Section 2 - Definitions (U) 

In addition to the definitions in sections 101 and 701 of the Act, the following definitions 
will apply to these procedures: 

(a) Acquisition means the collection by NSA or the FBI through electronic means of a non- 
public communication to which it is not an intended party. (U) 

(b) Communications concerning a United States person include all communications in which 
a United States person is discussed or mentioned, except where such communications 
reveal only publicly-available information about the person. (U) 

(c) Communications of a Um'ted States person include all communications to which a United 
States person is a party. (U) 

(d) Consent is the agreement by a person or organization to permit the NSA to take particular 
actions that affect the person or organization. To be effective, consent must be given by 
the affected person or organization with sufficient knowledge to understand the action 
that may be taken and the possible consequences of that action. Consent by an 
organization will be deemed valid if given on behalf of the organization by an official or 
governing body determined by the General Counsel, NSA, to have actual or apparent 
authority to make such an agreement. (U) 

Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52 
Dated: 20070108 
Declassify On: 20320108 
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(e) Foreign communication means a communication that has at least one communicant 
outside of the United States. All other communications, including communications in 
winch the sender and all intended recipients are reasonably believed to be located in the 
United States at the time of acquisition, are domestic communications. (S//SI) 

(f) Identification of a United States person means the name, unique title, address, or other 
personal identifier of a United States person in the context of activities conducted by that 
person or activities conducted by others that are related to that person. A reference to a 
product by brand name, or manufacturer's name or the use of a name in a descriptive 
sense, e.g., "Monroe Doctrine," is not an identification of a United States person. (S//SI) 

(g) Processed or processing means any step necessary to convert a communication into an 
intelligible fonn intended for human inspection. (U) 

(h) Publicly-available information means information that a member of the public could 
obtain on request, by research in public sources, or by casual observation. (U) 

(i) Technical data base means information retained for cryptanalytic, traffic analytic, or 
signal exploitation purposes. (S//SI) 

(j) United States person means a United States person as defined in the Act. The following 
guidelines apply in determining whether a person whose status is unknown is a United 
States person: (U) 

(1) A person known to be currently in the United States will be treated as a United States 
person unless positively identified as an alien who has not been admitted for 
permanent residence, or unless the nature or circumstances of the person's 
communications give rise to a reasonable belief that such person is not a United 
States person. (U) 

(2) A person known to be currently outside the United States, or whose location is 
unknown, will not be treated as a United States person unless such person can be 
positively identified as such, or the nature or circumstances of the person's 
communications give rise to a reasonable belief that such person is a United States 
person. (U) 

(3) A person known to be an alien admitted for permanent residence loses status as a 
United States person if the person leaves the United States and is not in compliance 
with 8 U.S.C. § 1203 enabling re-entry into the United States. Failure to follow the 
statutory procedures provides a reasonable basis to conclude that the alien has 
abandoned any intention of maintaining his status as a permanent resident alien. (U) 

(4) An unincorporated association whose headquarters or primary office is located 
outside the United States is presumed not to be a United States person unless there is 
information indicating that a substantial number of its members are citizens of the 
United States or aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence. (U) 

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Section 3 - Acquisition and Processing - General (U) 

(a) Acquisition (U) 

The acquisition of information by targeting non-United States persons reasonably believed to 
be located outside the United States pursuant to section 702 of the Act will be effected in 
accordance with an authorization made by the Attorney General and Director of National 
Intelligence pursuant to subsection 702(a) of the Act and will be conducted in a manner 
designed, to the greatest extent reasonably feasible, to minimize the acquisition of 
information not relevant to the authorized purpose of the acquisition. (S//SI) 

(b) Monitoring, Recording, and Processing (U) 

(1) Personnel will exercise reasonable judgment in determining whether information 
acquired must be minimized and will destroy inadvertently acquired communications 
of or concerning a United States person at the earliest practicable point in the 
processing cycle at which such communication can be identified either: as clearly not 
relevant to the authorized purpose of the acquisition (e.g., the communication does 
not contain foreign intelligence information); or, as not containing evidence of a 
crime which may be disseminated under these procedures. Such inadvertently 
acquired communications of or concerning a United States person may be retained no 
longer than five years in any event. The communications that may be retained 
include electronic communications acquired because of limitations on NSA's ability 
to filter communications. (S//SI) 

(2) Communications of or concerning United States persons that may be related to the 
authorized purpose of the acquisition maybe forwarded to analytic personnel 
responsible for producing intelligence information from the collected data. Such 
communications or information may be retained and disseminated only in accordance 
with Sections 4, 5, 6, and 8 of these procedures. (C) 

(3) Magnetic tapes or other storage media that contain acquired communications may be 
processed. (S) 

(4) As a communication is reviewed, NSA analyst(s) will determine whether it is a 
domestic or foreign communication to, from, or about a target and is reasonably 
believed to contain foreign intelligence information or evidence of a crime. Only 
such communications may be processed. All other communications may be retained 
or disseminated only in accordance with Sections 5, 6, and 8 of these procedures. 
(S//SI) 

(5) Magnetic tapes or other storage media containing communications acquired pursuant 
to section 702 may be scanned by computer to identify and select communications for 
analysis. Computer selection terms used for scanning, such as telephone numbers, 
key words or phrases, or other discriminators, will not include United States person 



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names or identifiers and will be limited to those selection terms reasonably likely to 
return information about foreign intelligence targets. (S//S1) 

(6) Further processing, retention and dissemination of foreign communications will be 
made in accordance with Sections 4, 6, 7, and 8 as applicable, below. Further 
processing, storage and dissemination of inadvertently acquired domestic 
communications will be made in accordance with Sections 4, 5, and 8 below. (S//SI) 

(c) Destruction of Raw Data (C) 

Communications and other information, including that reduced to graphic or "hard copy" 
form such as facsimile, telex, computer data, or equipment emanations, will be reviewed for 
retention in accordance with the standards set forth in these procedures. Communications 
and other information, in any form, that do not meet such retention standards and that are 
known to contain communications of or concerning United States persons will be destroyed 
upon, recognition, and may be retained no longer than five years in any event. The 
communi cations that may be retained include electronic communications acquired because of 
limitations on NSA's ability to filter communications. (S//SI) 

(d) Change in Target's Location or Status (S//SI) 

(1) In the event that NSA determines that a person is reasonably believed to be located 
outside the United States and after targeting this person learns that the person is inside 
the United States, or if NSA concludes that a person who at the time of targeting was 
believed to be a non-United States person is in fact a United States person, the 
acquisition from that person will be terminated without delay. (S//SI) 

(2) Any communications acquired through the targeting of a person who at the time of 
targeting was reasonably believed to be located outside the United States but is in fact 
located inside the United States at the time such communications were acquired, and 
any communications acquired by targeting a person who at the time of targeting was 
believed to be a non-United States person but was in fact a United States person, will 
be treated as domestic communications under these procedures. (S//SI) 

Section 4 - Acquisition and Processing - Attorney-Client Communications (C) 

As soon as it becomes apparent that a communication is between a person who is known to 
be under criminal indictment in the United States and an attorney who represents that 
individual in the matter under indictment (or someone acting on behalf of the attorney), 
monitoring of that communication will cease and the communication will be identified as an 
attorney-client communication in a log maintained for that purpose. The relevant portion of 
the communication containing that conversation will be segregated and the National Security 
Division of the Department of Justice will be notified so that appropriate procedures may be 
established to protect such communications from review or use in any criminal prosecution, 
while preserving foreign intelligence information contained therein. Additionally, all 
proposed disseminations of information constituting United States person attorney-client 

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privileged communications must be reviewed by the NSA Office of General Counsel prior to 
dissemination. (S//SI) 

Section 5 - Domestic Communications (U) 

A communication identified as a domestic communication will be promptly destroyed upon 
recognition unless the Director (or Acting Director) of NSA specifically determines, in 
writing, that: (S) 

(1) the communication is reasonably believed to contain significant foreign intelligence 
information. Such conununication may be provided to the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) (including United States person identities) for possible 
dissemination by the FBI in accordance with its minimization procedures; (S) 

(2) the communication does not contain foreign intelligence information but is 
reasonably believed to contain evidence of a crime that has been, is being, or is about 
to be committed. Such conununication may be disseminated (including United States 
person identities) to appropriate Federal law enforcement authorities, in accordance 
with 50 U.S.C. §§ 1806(b) and 1825(c), Executive Order No. 12333, and, where 
applicable, the crimes reporting procedures set out in the August 1995 "Memorandum 
of Understanding: Reporting of Information Concerning Federal Crimes," or any 
successor document. Such communications may be retained by NSA for a reasonable 
period of time, not to exceed six months unless extended in writing by the Attorney 
General, to permit law enforcement agencies to determine whether access to original 
recordings of such conununications is required for law enforcement purposes; (S) 

(3) the communication is reasonably believed to contain technical data base information, 
as defined in Section 2(i), or information necessary to understand or assess a 
communications security vulnerability. Such communication may be provided to the 
FBI and/or disseminated to other elements of the United States Government. Such 
communications may be retained for a period sufficient to allow a thorough 
exploitation and to permit access to data that are, or are reasonably believed likely to 
become, relevant to a current or future foreign intelligence requirement. Sufficient 
duration may vary with the nature of the exploitation. (S//SI) 

a. In the context of a cryptanalytic effort, maintenance of technical data bases 
requires retention of all communications that are enciphered or reasonably 
believed to contain secret meaning, and sufficient duration may consist of any 
period of time during which encrypted material is subject to, or of use in, 
cryptanalysis. (S//SI) 

b. In the case of communications that are not enciphered or otherwise thought to 
contain secret meaning, sufficient duration is five years unless the Signal 
Intelligence Director, NSA, determines in writing that retention for a longer 
period is required to respond to authorized foreign intelligence or 
counterintelligence requirements; or (S//SI) 

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(4) the communication contains information pertaining to a threat of serious harm to life 
or property. (S) 

Notwithstanding the above, if a domestic communication indicates that a target has entered 
the United States. NSA may advise the FBI of that fact. Moreover, technical data regarding 
domestic communications may be retained and provided to the FBI and CIA for collection 
avoidance purposes. (S//SI) 

Section 6 - Foreign Communications of or Concerning United States Persons (U) 

(a) Retention (U) 

Foreign communications of or concerning United States persons collected in the course of an 
acquisition authorized under section 702 of the Act may be retained only: 

(1) if necessary for the maintenance of technical data bases. Retention for tins purpose is 
permitted for a period sufficient to allow a thorough exploitation and to permit access 
to data that are, or are reasonably believed likely to become, relevant to a current or 
future foreign intelligence requirement. Sufficient duration may vary with the nature 
of the exploitation. 

a. In the context of a cryptanalytic effort, maintenance of technical data bases 
requires retention of all communications that are enciphered or reasonably 
believed to contain secret meaning, and sufficient duration may consist of any 
period of time during which encrypted material is subject to, or of use in, 
cryptanalysis. 

b. In the case of communications that are not enciphered or otherwise thought to 
contain secret meaning, sufficient duration is five years unless the Signals 
Intelligence Director, NSA, determines in writing that retention for a longer 
period is required to respond to authorized foreign intelligence or 
counterintelligence requirements; 

(2) if dissemination of such communications with reference to such United States persons 
would be permitted under subsection (b) below; or 

(3) if the information is evidence of a crime that has been, is being, or is about to be 
committed and is provided to appropriate federal law enforcement authorities. (S//SI) 

(b) Dissemination (U) 

A report based on communications of or concerning a United States person may be 
disseminated in accordance with Section 7 or 8 if the identity of the United States person is 
deleted and a generic term or symbol is substituted so that the information cannot reasonably 
be connected with an identifiable United States person. Otherwise, dissemination of 
intelligence reports based on communications of or concerning a United States person may 

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only be made to a recipient requiring the identity of such person for the performance of 
official duties but only if at least one of the following criteria is also met: 

(1) the United States person has consented to dissemination or the information of or 
concerning the United States person is available publicly; 

(2) the identity of the United States person is necessary to understand foreign intelligence 
information or assess its importance, e.g., the identity of a senior official in the 
Executive Branch; 

(3) the communication or information indicates that the United States person may be: 

a. an agent of a foreign power: 

b. a foreign power as defined in Section 101(a) of the Act; 

c. residing outside the United States and holding an official position in the 
government or military forces of a foreign power; 

d. a corporation or other entity that is owned or controlled directly or indirectly by a 
foreign power; or 

e. acting in collaboration with an intelligence or security service of a foreign power 
and the United States person has, or has had, access to classified national security 
information or material; 

(4) the communication or information indicates that the United States person may be the 
target of intelligence activities of a foreign power; 

(5) the communication or information indicates that the United States person is engaged 
in the unauthorized disclosure of classified national security information or the 
United States person's identity is necessary to understand or assess a communications 
security vulnerability, but only after the agency that originated the information 
certifies that it is properly classified; 

(6) the communication or information indicates that the United States person may be 
engaging in international terrorist activities; 

(7) the acquisition of the United States person's communication was authorized by a 
court order issued pursuant to the Act and the communication may relate to the 
foreign intelligence purpose of the surveillance; or 

(8) the communication or information is reasonably believed to contain evidence that a 
crime has been, is being, or is about to be committed, provided that dissemination is 
for law enforcement purposes and is made in accordance with 50 U.S.C. §§ 1806(b) 
and 1825(c), Executive Order No. 12333, and, where applicable, the crimes reporting 

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procedures set out in the August 1995 "Memorandum of Understanding: Reporting of 
Information Concerning Federal Crimes," or any successor document. (U) 

(c) Provision of Unminimized Communications to CIA and FBI (S//NF) 

(1) TSJSA may provide to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) unminimized 
communications acquired pursuant to section 702 of the Act. CIA will 
identify to NSA targets for which NSA may provide unminimized 
communications to CIA. CIA will process any such unminimized 
communications received from NSA in accordance with CIA minimization 
procedures adopted by the Attorney General, in consultation with the Director 
of National Intelligence, pursuant to subsection 702(e) of the Act. (S//SI//NF) 

(2) NSA may provide to the FBI umninimized communications acquired pursuant to 
section 702 of the Act. The FBI will identify to NSA targets for which NSA may 
provide unminimized communications to the FBI. The FBI will process any such 
umninimized communications received from NSA in accordance with FBI 
nnnimization procedures adopted by the Attorney General, in consultation with the 
Director of National Intelligence, pursuant to subsection 702(e) of the Act. (S//SI) 

Section 7 - Other Foreign Communications (U) 

Foreign communications of or concerning a non-United States person may be retained, used, 
and disseminated hi any form in accordance with other applicable law, regulation, and policy. 
(U) 

Section 8 - Collaboration with Foreign Governments (S//SI) 

(a) Procedures for the dissemination of evaluated and minimized information . Pursuant to 
Section 1.7(c)(8) of Executive Order No. 12333, as amended, NSA conducts foreign 
cryptologic liaison relationships with certain foreign governments. Information acquired 
pursuant to section 702 of the Act may be disseminated to a foreign government. Except 
as provided in subsection 8(b) of these procedures, any dissemination to a foreign 
government of information of or concerning a United States person that is acquired 
pursuant to section 702 may only be done in a manner consistent with subsections 6(b) 
and 7 of these NSA minimization procedures. (S) 

(b) Procedures for technical or linguistic assistance. It is anticipated that NSA may obtain 
information or communications that, because of their technical or linguistic content, may 
require further analysis by foreign governments to assist NSA in determining their 
meaning or significance. Notwithstanding other provisions of these minimization 
procedures, NSA may disseminate computer disks, tape recordings, transcripts, or other 
information or items containing unminimized information or communications acquired 
pursuant to section 702 to foreign governments for further processing and analysis, under 
the following restrictions with respect to any materials so disseminated: (S) 



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(1) Dissemination to foreign governments will be solely for translation or analysis 
of such information or communications, and assisting foreign governments 
will make no use of any information or any communication of or concerning 
any person except to provide technical and linguistic assistance to NSA. (S) 

(2) Dissemination will be only to those personnel within foreign governments 
involved in the translation or analysis of such information or communications. 
The number of such personnel will be restricted to the extent feasible. There 
will be no dissemination within foreign governments of this unminimized data 
(S) 

(3) Foreign governments will make no permanent agency record of information or 
communications of or concerning any person referred to or recorded on 
computer disks, tape recordings, transcripts, or other items disseminated by 
NSA to foreign governments, provided that foreign governments may 
maintain such temporary records as are necessary to enable them to assist 
NSA with the translation or analysis of such information. Records maintained 
by foreign governments for this purpose may not be disseminated within the 
foreign governments, except to personnel involved in providing technical or 
linguistic assistance to NSA. (S) 

(4) Upon the conclusion of such teclxnical or linguistic assistance to NSA, 
computer disks, tape recordings, transcripts, or other items or information 
disseminated to foreign governments will either be returned to NSA or be 
destroyed with an accounting of such destruction made to NSA. (S) 

(5) Any information that foreign governments provide to NSA as a result of such 
technical or linguistic assistance may be disseminated by NSA in accordance 
with these minimization procedures. (S) 




1 ~ ^S - C j^ 

Date Eric H. Holder, Jr. 

Attorney General of the United^tates 



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